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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. Case No. 20030996-CA 
MELVIN REDHORSE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction of theft, a second degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1999), in the Seventh Judicial District, San Juan County, 
the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2002). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Where the prosecutor presented a race- and gender-neutral explanation for his 
peremptory challenge of a venire person, did the trial court properly permit the strike? 
Alternatively, where the prosecutor articulated both a neutral and a non-neutral 
explanation for his strike, but demonstrated that he would have exercised the strike absent 
the non-neutral reason, did the trial court properly permit the strike? 
'The trial court's conclusion as to whether or not a prima facie case was 
established is a legal determination . . . review[ed] for correctness, according it no 
particular deference." State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 459 (Utah App. 1993). However, 
the trial court's determination as to whether the opponent of the peremptory strike has 
proved purposeful discrimination "generally turns on the credibility of the proponent of 
the strike and will not be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous." State v. Higginbotham, 
917 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 1996); accord State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18,11 5, 41 P.3d 
1153. Whether a trial court may permit a strike where the prosecutor articulates both a 
neutral and a non-neutral explanation for the strike, but demonstrates that he would have 
exercised the strike absent the non-neutral reason, is a question of law. See State v. 
Jensen, 2003 UT App 273, f 19, 76 P.3d 188. 
2. Was the denial of defendant's motion for a new trial an abuse of discretion 
where the trial court determined, after making credibility findings, that no juror formed or 
expressed an opinion about defendant's guilt prior to deliberations? 
This court "review[s] the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a new trial 
under an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 1992). 
It reviews for clear error the trial court's underlying findings of the fact. Id. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with theft, a second degree felony. R. 1. 
A jury found defendant guilty. R. 86. Defendant was sentenced to a prison term of one 
to fifteen years and ordered to pay a fine and restitution. R. 89. The court stayed the 
prison sentence and placed defendant on probation, subject to his timely payment of 
installments on the fine and restitution. R. 89-90. 
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Defendant subsequently moved for a new trial. R. 92. He claimed, among other 
things, that certain jurors had discussed his guilt prior to deliberations. R. 93-95. The 
court held an evidentiary hearing on the allegation. R. 137-141 (memorandum decision), 
147 (transcript of hearing). The court subsequently addressed discrepancies between the 
testimony of various witnesses, made credibility determinations and factual findings, and 
denied the motion for a new trial. R. 137-142. Defendant timely appealed. R. 143. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The crime. Defendant, a Native American, worked as an artist for Hozhoni 
Pottery, owned by Craig Simpson. R. 148:85,92. As part of his work, defendant, along 
with other artists, created designs that were incorporated into stencils. R. 148:88-89. 
Simpson paid for the art work incorporated into the stencils and for the cutting of the 
stencils. Id. Defendant was paid by the hour for his design and stencil work. R. 148:89. 
Simpson also paid for the materials used and for the overhead associated with the 
manufacturing facility. R. 148:94. When employees left, the stencils remained with the 
business. R. 148:89. No royalties were paid for the use of designs. R. 148:97. 
Simpson later sold Hozhoni Pottery to Cedar Mesa. R. 148:104. The sale 
included approximately eight lines of stencils. R. 148:104, 108. Defendant, however, 
took seven of the lines sometime during the transfer of ownership. R. 148:108, 113. 
Defendant apparently believed that the designs were his and that he should be paid for 
them. R. 148:119. 
Simpson later asked defendant to return the stencils. R. 148:128. Defendant 
claimed he had thrown them away. Id. Simpson and Joe Lyman of Cedar Mesa spent 
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two weeks reproducing the lines. R. 148:180-81. A third individual was hired to assist. 
Id. 
Jury selection. During jury selection, defense counsel challenged the prosecutor's 
peremptory strike of venire person, Sharon Lee, a Native American, apparently claiming 
possible racial motivation in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712 
(1986). R. 148:56, 58-62. The trial court discussed the strike with the parties outside the 
presence of the jury. R. 148:58. 
The court, observing that the prosecutor had "conceded that there was—that he 
presumptively should give an explanation" for the strike, asked the prosecutor why he 
had stricken Ms. Lee. Id. The prosecutor stated that he did not know Ms. Lee's 
ethnicity, but conceded that she appeared to be Native American. R. 148:59. He then 
offered three explanations for the strike: 
• "I didn't want to remove the juror entirely for men .. . ." Id. 
• "Several of the other jurors I knew or at leas[t] know—have been aware of their 
families and different things about them, and . . . sometimes when I know 
someone over someone I don't know, I leave them on." Id. 
• "I felt that M[s]. Lee was, ah, reserved, meek, not assertive .. . fairly quiet and it's 
my desire to have someone to be assertive and take a stand . . . I think that serves 
the prosecution . . . . that's the reason for my taking her off." Id. 
The trial judge noted that, at the time the prosecutor exercised his peremptory 
strikes, two Native Americans remained on the panel and the prosecutor struck only one. 
R. 148:61. The judge observed that he too had noted that Ms. Lee was reserved. Id. He 
found that the reason articulated by the prosecutor, i.e., that Ms. Lee was reserved and not 
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assertive, was non-discriminatory. R. 148:62. He also found that this was "the real 
reason" for the strike and not a pretext. Id. 
Alleged juror misconduct Defendant moved for a new trial, offering the affidavit 
of a juror who stated that she had overheard two jurors discussing the case on the first 
day of trial and that one had said to the other that defendant was guilty. R. 92, 95, 101. 
The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the matter. R. 137, 147. Four jurors 
testified, including the juror who claimed that the incident occurred ("Warren"), the two 
who allegedly discussed defendant's guilt ("Vigil" and "Young"), and a fourth juror who 
testified to another conversation ("Pehrson"). SeeR. 147. 
Warren testified that during a recess on the first morning of trial she heard Vigil 
tell Young that defendant was guilty. R. 147:6. Pehrson said that she heard Vigil and 
Young talking and that one of them said "those templets [templates or stencils] belonged 
to that man that bought 'em and that [defendant] was guilty." R. 147:20. 
Young denied that she and Vigil had discussed defendant's guilt prior to 
deliberations. R. 147:28. She said that she and Vigil were not friends, but did 
acknowledge that she and Vigil had a conversation during the break "about my late 
husband." R. 147:28,30. 
Vigil also testified that she and Young had not discussed defendant's guilt prior to 
jury deliberations, but had discussed the death of Young's husband and some life 
insurance issues that Young was facing. R. 147:36-37. Asked whether she had any 
reason to think that Warren disliked her, Vigil testified that she did. R. 147:42. Vigil 
explained that she was an eligibility specialist with Workforce Services and that her 
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responsibilities included fraud investigations. R. 147:43. Asked whether she had any 
reason, because of her employment, to believe that Warren "might consider [Vigil] to be 
responsible for something bad" that happened to Warren, Vigil answered, "Definitely." 
Id. 
The trial judge filed a memorandum decision denying the motion for a new trial. 
R. 137, 141. He detailed his findings, including a finding that the testimony of Vigil and 
Young was credible. R. 139. The judge noted that Warren and Pehrson differed as to 
where the alleged conversation occurred and that Warren's dislike for Vigil was evident 
and did not appear to be based on facts. R. 139-40. He found that "[a]t the time of the 
only morning recess on the first day, which is when Warren claimed to have heard a 
conversation, no testimony had been presented nor had either lawyer made an opening 
statement." R. 140. He found that Warren was not telling the truth and that she was 
"motivated by remorse over voting to convict defendant and by her dislike of Vigil." Id. 
He found that Pehrson believed that she was telling the truth, but that the conversation to 
which she referred "actually occurred after deliberations had begun." R. 140-41. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. No Batson violation occurred. The prosecutor presented a race- and gender-
neutral explanation for his removal of Ms. Lee, and the trial judge found the explanation 
believable. If the prosecutor gave both a neutral and a non-neutral explanation, he 
demonstrated that the strike would have been exercised absent the non-neutral 
explanation. Thus, the strike did not violate Equal Protection. 
6 
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion 
for a new trial. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether one or 
more jurors had formed an opinion regarding defendant's guilt or had discussed 
defendant's guilt prior to jury deliberations. After taking testimony, the trial judge found 
that the jurors who testified that no conversation occurred were credible and the juror 
who testified that the conversation did occur was not credible. The findings, which are 




NO BATSON VIOLATION OCCURRED; THE PROSECUTOR 
OFFERED A RACE- AND GENDER-NEUTRAL EXPLANATION 
FOR HIS THIRD PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it accepted the prosecutor's 
explanation regarding the use of a peremptory challenge. Br. Aplt. at 9. The prosecutor 
offered a race- and gender-neutral explanation for the strike, and the trial court did not 
clearly err when it found that the explanation offered was believable and not a mere 
pretext for a non-neutral motivation. 
A. Equal protection limits the use of peremptory challenges. 
"Ordinarily, prosecutors have the freedom to base peremptory challenges on any 
reasons related to their views of the outcome of the case about to be tried." State v. 
Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 462 (Utah App. 1993). However, that privilege is "subject to the 
commands of the Equal Protection Clause." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 
7 
S.Ct. 1712, 1719 (1986). Thus, "parties in a criminal action are prohibited from engaging 
in purposeful racial discrimination in exercising peremptory challenges of potential 
jurors." State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah 1996) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. 
at 90, 106 S.Ct. at 1719); accord State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, If 14, 994 P.2d 177. 
Likewise, "the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination injury selection on the 
basis of gender, or on the assumption that an individual will be biased in a particular case 
for no reason other than the fact that the person happens to be a woman or happens to be 
a man." J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 146, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994); accord 
State v. Jensen, 2003 UT App 273, f 13, 76 P.3d 188; State v. Chatwin, 2002 UT App 
363, f 6, 58 P.3d 867; State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, H 28, 989 P.2d 503. 
"Discrimination injury selection, whether based on race or on gender, causes harm 
to the litigants, the community, and the individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded 
from participation in the judicial process." J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140, 114 S.Ct. at 1427. As 
a result, "if purposeful discrimination is ultimately found, reversal of the defendant's 
conviction is mandated, without regard to the harmlessness of the constitutional error." 
State v. Macial, 854 P.2d 543, 545 (Utah App. 1993) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 100, 106 
S.Ct. at 1721). 
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B. To determine whether peremptory strikes comply with equal protection 
principles, courts apply a three-step analysis. When a strike is exercised for 
both discriminatory and non-discriminatory reasons, courts must further 
determine whether the strike would have been exercised absent the improper 
motive. 
Under Batson and its progeny, trial courts engage in a three-step analysis for 
determining whether a party challenging a peremptory strike has demonstrated an equal 
protection violation: 
[Ojnce the opponent of a peremptory challenge has made out a prima 
facie case of [ ] discrimination (step one), the burden of production shifts to the 
proponent of the strike to come forward with a [neutral] explanation (step two). 
If a [neutral] explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide (step 
three) whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful [ ] 
discrimination. 
Purkettv. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1770-71 (1995) {per curiam) 
(applying the analysis to race-based claims); accord, J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 144-45, 114 
S.Ct. at 1429-30; Cooperwood v. Cambra, 245 F.3d 1042, 1045-46 (9th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 534 U.S. 900, 122 S.Ct. 228 (2001); Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 547. 
Where the proponent of the strike proffers both a non-neutral and a neutral 
explanation, most courts conduct a dual motivation analysis. Dual motivation principles 
permit a strike, even where the proponent has articulated a non-neutral reason, if the 
proponent can demonstrate that he would have exercised the strike absent that non-
neutral reason. See Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222, 234-235 (3d Cir. 2002), United States 
v. Tokars, 95 F.3d 1520, 1533 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 
1530-1532 (8th Cir. 1995); Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 421-422 (4th Cir. 1995); 
Howard v. Senkonski, 986 F.2d 24, 27-31 (2d Cir. 1993); State v. Hodge, 726 A.2d 531, 
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544 (Conn. 1999); State v. Gattis, 1996 WL 769328, *4 (Del. Super. 1996) (unpublished) 
(attached in Addendum); People v. Hudson, 745 N.E.2d 1246, 1256 (111. 2001); Guzman 
v. State, 85 S.W.3d 242, 246-247 (Texas Crim. App. 2002) (en banc). 
1. Establishing a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. 
Under the first step of the analysis, the party opposing the strike must "make out a 
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing that the totality of the relevant 
facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose." Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94, 
106 S.Ct. at 1721; accord J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 144-45, 114 S.Ct. at 1429-30; Colwell, 2000 
UT 8, H 18. The purpose behind this first step is "to 'separate meritless claims of 
discrimination from those that may have merit.," State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 455 
(Utah 1994) (quoting United States v. Malindez, 962 F.2d 332, 334 (4th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 506 U.S. 875, 113 S.Ct. 215 (1992)). This step "requires more than simply 
showing that one or more minority jurors were peremptorily stricken." State v. Harrison, 
805 P.2d 769, 777 (Utah App. 1991), accord Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at 11 18. "[A]s a 
general rule, a 'defendant who requests a prima facie finding of purposeful discrimination 
is obligated to develop [some] record beyond numbers, in support of the asserted 
violation.'" Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 457 (quoting United States v. Brown, 941 F.2d 656, 659 
(8th Cir. 1991)); Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at 11 18. And "[wjhile numerical evidence alone 
may be sufficient to establish a pattern of peremptory strikes against minority jurors, 
numerical e\ idence alone does not necessarily establish a prima facie case." Shepherd, 
1999 UT App 305 at 11 30 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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In addition to demonstrating that the excluded panel members "belong to a 
cognizable group," the opponent of the strike must show "that there exists 'a strong 
likelihood that such persons are being challenged because of their group association 
rather than because of any specific bias.'" Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 456 (quoting State v. 
Cantu (Cantu II), 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989)); accord Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305 
at U 29. "To satisfy this burden, the opponent of the strike must create a record 
establishing sufficient evidence to support the allegation of purposeful [ ] 
discrimination." State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18, H 8, 41 P.3d 1153. When 
determining whether the opponent has met his burden, the trial court "must undertake a 
'factual inquiry' that 'takes into account all possible explanatory factors' in the particular 
case." Batson, 476 U.S. at 95, 106 S.Ct. at 1722 (citations omitted). "For example, a 
'pattern' of strikes against [minority] jurors . . . might give rise to an inference of 
discrimination. Similarly, the prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire 
examination and in exercising his challenges may support or refute an inference of 
discriminatory purpose." Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723; accord Alvarez, 872 
P.2dat455. 
The proponent of a strike may, however, waive this step "by not raising it before 
explaining the reasons for its peremptory challenges." Jensen, 2003 UT App 273 at f 14 
(citations omitted). 
2. Offering a neutral explanation for the peremptory strike. 
After an opponent has met his burden to demonstrate a prima facie case or after the 
proponent has waived this burden, the proponent "must articulate a neutral explanation 
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related to the particular case to be tried." Batson, 476 U S at 97-98, 106 S Ct at 1724, 
accord JEB , 511 U S at 144-45, 114 S Ct at 1429-30 The proponent of a stnke 
cannot satisfy step two "by merely denying that he had a discriminatory motive or by 
merely affirming his good faith." Purkett, 514 U S at 769, 115 S Ct. at 1771 On the 
other hand, this second step "does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even 
plausible." Id. at 768, 115 S.Ct. at 1771; see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S Ct at 
1723 (stating that the "explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a 
challenge for cause") All that is required is an explanation that "does not deny equal 
protection." Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769, 115 S.Ct. at 1771. Unless a discriminatory intent 
is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed [ ] neutral." 
Id at 768, 115 S.Ct. at 1771 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This is so 
because "the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding [] motivation rests with, and never 
shifts from, the opponent of the stnke."1 Id. 
1
 In Batson, the Supreme Court explained that the proponent of the stnke "must give a 
'clear and reasonably specific' explanation of his 'legitimate reasons' for exercising the 
challenges " Batson, 476 U S. at 98 n 20, 106 S Ct at 1724 n 20 (citations omitted) Based 
on this language, Utah courts have concluded that the explanation by the proponent of the 
stnke "must be '(1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tned, (3) clear and reasonably 
specific, and (4) legitimate.'" Higginbotham, 917 P 2d at 548 (quoting Cantu II, 778 P 2d at 
518) These latter two requirements, however, do not necessitate that the explanation be 
logical or persuasive As later explained by the Supreme Court in Purkett, they were simply 
"meant to reflate the notion that a prosecutor could satisfy his burden of production by merely 
den>ing that he had a discnminatory motive or by merely affirming his good faith " Purkett, 
5 14 U S at 769, 115 S Ct at 1771 In other words, "a 'legitimate reason' is not a reason that 
makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection " Id 
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3. Proving purposeful discrimination. 
The third step "requires the trial court to decide whether the opponent of the 
peremptory challenge has proved purposeful [ ] discrimination." Higginbothanu 917 
P.2d at 548; accord Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724. In other words, the trial 
court must determine whether the proponent's "'explanation for a peremptory challenge 
should be believed.,,, State v. Bowman, 945 P.2d 153, 156 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting 
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1869 (1991)). "[T]he 
question is not whether the prosecutor's explanation for the strike was factually correct, 
but whether it was a pretext to disguise a [discriminatory] motive/' Id. at 156; accord 
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 549 n.3 (holding that ua peremptory challenge can be made 
even for a mistaken reason so long as it is not racially motivated"). 
In this step, "the persuasiveness of the [proponent's] justification becomes relevant." 
Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. at 1771. As observed by the United States Supreme 
Court, "[a]t [this] stage, implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be 
found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination." Id. "There will seldom be much 
evidence bearing on th[is] issue, and the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the 
attorney who exercises the challenge." Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365, 111 
S.Ct. 1859, 1869 (1991). Accordingly, "[i]n determining whether the peremptory 
challenge involved purposeful [ ] discrimination, the trial court must undertake a 
sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be 
available." Cannon, 2002 UT App 18 at U 13 (internal quotes and citations omitted). 
Factors that may bear on the credibility of the explanation offered include the following 
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"(1) alleged group bias not shown to be shared by the juror in question, 
"(2) failure to examine the juror or perfunctory examination assuming neither the 
trial court nor opposing counsel had questioned the juror, 
"(3) singling the juror out for special questioning designed to evoke a certain 
response, 
"(4) the prosecutor's reason is unrelated to the facts of the case, and 
"(5) a challenge based on reasons equally applicable to juror[s] who were not 
challenged." 
Bowman, 945 P 2d at 155-56 (quoting Cantu II, 778 P 2d at 518-19) (paragraphing 
added). 
4. Demonstrating that the strike would have been exercised in the absence of the 
improper motivation—dual motivation analysis. 
Finally, in the infrequent case where the proponent articulates both a neutral and a 
non-neutral explanation for his strike, most courts apply a "dual motivation" analysis 
See Gattis v Snyder, 278 F.3d 222, 234-235 (3d Cir. 2002), United States v Tokars, 95 
F 3d 1520, 1533 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v Darden, 70 F 3d 1507, 1530-1532 (8th 
Cir 1995), Jones v Plaster, 57 F 3d 417, 421-422 (4th Cir. 1995), Howard v Senko\xski, 
986 F 2d 24, 27-31 (2d Cir. 1993); State v Hodge, 726 A 2d 531, 544 (Conn. 1999), 
State v Gattis, 1996 WL 769328, *4 (Del. Super. 1996) (unpublished); People v 
Hudson, 745 N.E.2d 1246, 1256 (111. 2001); Guzman v State, 85 S.W 3d 242, 245-246 
(Texas Cnm. App. 2002) (en banc). Cf People v Howard, 601 N.Y S 2d 548, 552 (N Y 
County Court 1993) Dual motivation principles permit a strike, even where the 
proponent has articulated a non-neutral reason, if the proponent can demonstrate that he 
would have exercised the stnke absent that non-neutral reason. 
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A few courts, however, refuse to consider the proponent's neutral reasons. See Ex 
Parte Sockwell, 675 So.2d 38, 40 (Ala. 1995); State v. Lucas, 18 P.3d 160, 163 (Ariz. 
2001); Payton v. Kearse, 495 S.E.2d 205, 210 (S.C. 1998). Cf. Rector v. State, 444 
S.E.2d 862, 863 (Ga. App. 1994); State v. King, 572 N.W.2d 530, 535 (Wis. App. 1997). 
They reason that the proffered non-neutral reason "taints" any other neutral reason for the 
strike. 
This is an issue of first impression in Utah. See Jensen, 2003 UT App 273 % 19 
(noting that "Utah courts have not yet adopted the dual motivation analysis" and 
"declining] to consider its adoption" under the circumstances of that case). For reasons 
detailed in the subsequent discussion, sound policy favors Utah's adoption of dual 
motivation principles, which have been adopted by the strong majority of courts, 
including every federal circuit court of appeal that has addressed the question. 
a. Dual motivation analysis 
Most courts considering the issue have held that a non-neutral reason for exercising 
a peremptory challenge is insufficient, by itself, to show a Batson violation if the 
proponent of the strike also articulates a neutral reason. "Dual motivation analysis grants 
the proponent of a strike the opportunity to raise an affirmative defense after the 
opponent of the strike has established a prima facie case of discrimination." Tokars, 95 
F.3d at 1533 (citation omitted). "[T]o prove this affirmative defense, the proponent of 
the strike bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the strike 
would have been exercised even in the absence of the discriminatory motivation." Id. 
(citation omitted). In other words, having articulated both a neutral and a non-neutral 
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explanation, the proponent "bears the burden of proof to persuade the trier that the 
challenges would have been exercised for race [or gender] neutral reasons even if race [or 
gender] had not been a factor." Howard, 986 F 2d at 24. 
b. Taint analysis 
Several state courts, however, have held that any non-neutral reason for striking a 
juror taints the entire jury selection process. "Once a discriminatory reason has been 
uncovered this reason taints any other neutral reason for the strike " See Lucas, 18 
P 3d at 163 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Once a prosecutor has 
articulated any discriminatory purpose for a strike, removal of the juror taints the 
proceeding and requires reversal of any ensuing conviction. Id Whether the prosecutor 
would have stricken the juror in the absence of the discriminatory purpose is irrelevant. 
See id 
c. Policy considerations 
Dual motivation analysis makes sense as a matter of policy The purpose for 
peremptory challenges is to seat a fair and impartial jury. See y £ 5 , 511 U S at 137 n 8, 
114 S Ct at 1426 n.8 ("only legitimate interest... in the exercise of [a party's] 
peremptory challenges is securing a fair and impartial jury"). That purpose is thwarted 
if, once a prosecutor expresses a non-neutral motivation for striking a juror, the tnal court 
has no choice but to seat the challenged juror, no matter how legitimate and compelling 
the prosecutor's other objections. 
Yet, courts that have rejected dual motivation analysis have not explained what 
action a tnal judge should take where a proffered explanation for peremptory stakes 
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includes both neutral and non-neutral bases. Rather, they have simply reversed 
convictions concluding that the jury selection was "tainted " Important questions remain 
unanswered. Must the tnal judge immediately seat the juror, effectively jeopardizing the 
victim's and the people's interest in a fair tnal, because the prosecutor has voiced a 
discriminatory motive? Should the judge, instead, release the venire and begin selection 
proceedings anew? What course should the tnal judge take to avoid reversal? Courts 
adopting taint analysis have not addressed and apparently have not considered these 
questions. The lack of clear answers for them suggests the weakness of taint analysis. 
Further, courts adopting taint analysis inaccurately reason that dual motivation 
analysis erodes Batson's protection of the equal protection interest. Dual motivation 
reasoning does not undermine equal protection. "[Djual motivation analysis has its roots 
in equal protection cases which hold that an action motivated in part by an impermissible 
reason will nonetheless be valid if the same action would have been taken in the absence 
of the impermissible motivation." People v Hudson, 745 N E 2d 1246, 1256 (111. 2001) 
(citing Tokars, 95 F 3d at 1533 n.4). 
The Second Circuit, the first court to apply dual motivation analysis to peremptory 
stnkes, looked to the Supreme Court's analysis of pve-Batson equal protection cases, 
including Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040 (1976), Village of Arlington 
Heights v Metropolitan Housing Dev Corp, 429 U S. 252, 97 S Ct. 555 (1977), and Mt 
Healthy City Sch Dist Bd ofEduc v Doyle, 429 U S 274, 97 S Ct. 568 (1977) In 
those cases, the Supreme Court articulated some guiding analytical pnnciples. 
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(1) "Racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause requires a racially 
discriminatory purpose." Guzman v. State, 85 SW.3d 242, 250 (Texas 2002) 
(en banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (discussing the 
above-cited pre-Batson equal protection cases). 
(2) "A plaintiff need not prove that the challenged action rested solely on racially 
discriminatory purposes; rather the test is whether a discriminatory purpose has 
been a motivating factor in the decision." Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
(3) If the plaintiff shows that a discriminatory purpose motivated a decision in 
part, the defendant then bears the burden of establishing that he would have 
made the same decision if the discriminatory purpose had not been considered 
or had not existed." Id. 
Under dual-motivation analysis, then, a peremptory challenge cannot stand where 
the prosecutor would not have made the decision, absent a discriminatory purposes, even 
where the discriminatory purpose is only one—even a small one—of his motivations. But 
where a prosecutor would have stricken the juror absent any discriminatory purpose, the 
strike can stand. Consequently, this analysis does not to jeopardize equal protection. 
Because dual motivation analysis is consistent with equal protection precedent and, at the 
same time, protects the people's interest in a fair trial, this Court should adopt the analysis 
for review of cases involving both neutral and non-neutral motivations for peremptory 
challenges. 
C. The prosecutor gave a neutral and nondiscriminatory reason for his 
peremptory challenge: he removed a venire person because she appeared timid 
and not assertive. 
The prosecutor apparently waived any requirement that defendant make a prima 
facie showing of racial discrimination. R. 148:58 (court stating that the prosecutor 
•'conceded" that he "presumptively should give an explanation" for striking Ms. Lee). 
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The trial court therefore properly asked the prosecutor why he exercised his third 
peremptory strike to remove her Id 
The prosecutor responded, "I didn't want to take off, ah, to remove the juror entirely 
for men." R 148 59 The meaning of that statement is not clear. After for-cause 
challenges, only two males remained on the venire. R. 68. Defendant exercised his first 
peremptory challenge to strike one of them. Id The prosecutor may have feared that 
staking the only remaining male from the jury would have subjected him to a challenge 
for gender discrimination. The desire to avoid a Batson challenge is not, of itself, an 
impermissibly discriminatory motive. 
In any case, the prosecutor gave two alternative reasons for the strike. First, he 
stated that he had some familiarity with the residents of his community, including some 
of the jurors or their families, and preferred a "known quantity" to an "unknown 
quantity" when choosing a jury. R. 148:60. It is permissible and non-discriminatory to 
strike a juror about whom the prosecutor knows little or nothing, but to retain a juror 
whom the prosecutor knows better and who therefore presents less uncertainty and 
potentially less risk. See Commonwealth v Eddings, 721 A.2d 1095, 1098 (Pa. Super 
1998) (stating that prosecutor's "hope[] to seat juror with whom he had been acquainted" 
was "legitimate race neutral reason[] for his strikes"). The trial court did not make a 
credibility determination as to this explanation. 
Second, the prosecutor explained that he struck Ms. Lee because she was unduly 
reserved. Id He felt that she was not sufficiently assertive and would be unwilling to 
take a stand Id He implied that she would therefore be less likely to convict. Id The 
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tnal judge, observing that he too had noted Ms Lee's reserved demeanor, made an 
explicit determination that the prosecutor had presented an honest explanation for the 
strike and that the explanation was not a pretext for a discriminatory motive R 
148 61-62 Consequently, the court allowed the strike to stand. Id 
Therefore, even should this Court conclude that the prosecutor's ambiguous 
statement that he "didn't want to . . remove the juror entirely for men" constitutes 
impermissible gender discrimination, this Court should conclude, under dual motivation 
analysis, that the prosecutor gave an alternative reason that was race and gender neutral 
The tnal court did not err when it found that the neutral explanation was non-pretextual 
Because the prosecutor would have stncken Ms. Lee for this neutral reason, apart from 
any consideration of race or gender, the stnke was non-discnminatory. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
IT DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL; THE 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT CLEARLY ERR IN EITHER ITS 
CREDIBILITY FINDINGS OR ITS FINDING THAT NO JUROR 
MISCONDUCT OCCURRED 
Defendant claims that the tnal court erred when it denied his motion for a new 
tnal. Br Aplt. at 12. This Court reviews the denial of a motion for a new tnal under an 
abuse of discretion standard. See State v Thomas, 830 P 2d 243, 245 (Utah 1992) It 
reviews for clear error the factual findings underlying the denial. Id To prevail on this 
claim, defendant must therefore show that the tnal court clearly erred when it found 
untrue allegations that two of the jurors had discussed defendant's guilt pnor to jury 
deliberations 
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Rule 17(k), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides the following guidelines: 
"At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separate or are 
sequestered, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty not to converse 
among themselves . . . and not to form or express an opinion [on any subject of the tnal] 
until the case is finally submitted to them." 
"For a juror to prejudge the case is serious misconduct." Roma v. Ford Motor Co., 
122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 154 (Cal. App. 2002), cert, granted and judgment vacated on 
other grounds by 123 S.Ct. 2072 (2003). At least in some circumstances, juror 
misconduct raises a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. See State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 
280 (Utah 1985) (prosecution mingled and conversed with jurors during recess); State v. 
Swain, 835 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Utah App. 1992) (victim engaged in conversation with juror 
during recess). 
In this case, the trial court held a hearing on the allegation that jurors Vigil and 
Young had discussed defendant's guilt and that at least one of them had formed and 
expressed an opinion about defendant's guilt before hearing all of the evidence. R. 147. 
Following testimony at the evidentiary hearing, the court heard argument on the issue. 
R. 147:47-54. The court concluded that if the allegation was true, defendant had likely 
suffered prejudice. R. 147:54-55. The court, however, indicated that the decisive 
question was whether or not the allegation was true. Id. 
A few days later, the court issued a memorandum decision on the matter. R. 137. 
It concluded that the allegation was not true. R. 139-40. The court concluded that 
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Warren, who made the allegation, was untruthful and that she was motivated by remorse 
over voting to convict defendant and by her dislike of Vigil. R. 140. 
The judge also noted another matter undermining Warren's credibility. He 
observed that Warren testified that the incident occurred during the only recess on the 
first morning of trial. R. 137, 140. He found it unlikely that a conversation about 
defendant's guilt would have taken place during that recess because, at that point, no 
evidence had been offered and opening statements had not even been made. Id. 
Other evidentiary hearing testimony undermined Warren's credibility. Vigil 
testified that Warren had reason to believe that Vigil, who conducted fraud investigations 
as part of her employment, had been responsible for "something bad" that had happened 
to Warren. R. 147:43. 
Moreover, the trial court, explaining its observation of Warren's demeanor, stated 
that "Warren's dislike for Vigil was evident and did not appear to be based on the facts/' 
R. 139. 
Based on the evidence presented and on its own observations of demeanor, the 
trial court did not clearly err when it found Vigil and Young to be credible, but Warren to 
be not credible. It did not clearly err when it found that the alleged misconduct did not 
occur. It therefore did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion for a 
new trial based on the alleged misconduct. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 
BARRON, Judge 
*1 The defendant, Robert Allen Gattis, was 
convicted of first degree murder and related offenses 
in the shooting death of his girlfriend, Shirley Y 
Slay This Court sentenced Gattis to death On direct 
appeal, Gattis' convictions and sentence were 
affirmed Gattis v State DelSupr, 637 A 2d 808 
(1094) Gattis then filed a motion for postconviction 
relief, which this Court denied Gattis v State, 
Del Super, CrA Nos IN90-05-1017 to 1019-R2, 
IN90-05- 1106 & U07-R2, Barron, J (Dec 28, 
1995) 
On appeal of the denial of Gattis' postconviction 
motion the Delaware Supreme Court, sitting en banc, 
heard oral arguments and remanded the matter to this 
Court to make factual findings and conclusions of 
law regarding two issues Gattis v State Del Supr, 
No 37 1996. Holland, J (Oct 15, 1996) (ORDER) 
The first issue, dealing with the State's theory of the 
homicide, requires a hearing and will be resolved by 
the Court in a separate opinion |FM j This is the 
Court's opinion on the second issue, which is whether 
the State improperly used one of its peremptory 
challenges during jury selection to exclude a potential 
juror for gender-related reasons in violation of the 
FM Because a hearing is required for only 
one of the two matters on remand this Court 
requested permission from the Supreme 
Court to issue separate opinions on the two 
matters The Supreme Court agreed to the 
bifurcation, advising this Court to issue an 
opinion on the gender issue on or betore 
December 13 1996, and an opinion on the 
theory of the homicide on or betore 
February 14, 1997 
ISSUE GENDER-BASED DISCRIWINA TIONIV 
JURY SELECTION 
Gattis argues that during jury selection the State 
improperly exercised one of its peremptory 
challenges to remove prospective juror Wilfred 
Moore from the jury panel Specifically, Gattis 
alleges that the State removed Moore for gender-
related reasons in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause and J E B \ Alabama e\ id TB, >P t b 
127, 114 SCt 1419 (1994) In response, the State 
argues that even though one of the prosecutors 
reasons for the challenge was based on gender the 
other reason was Moore's reluctance to impose the 
death penalty For this reason, the State contends that 
the paramount reason for the strike was gender-
neutral and that this Court should so find 
STANDARD OF REVIEW [F\21 
\\2 The Court makes the following 
procedural note Gattis' contention regarding 
jury selection is before the Court on a 
remand of an appeal of this Court's denial oi 
Gattis' motion for postconviction relief filed 
pursuant to Super C t (. rim R 61 In its order 
of remand, the Supreme Court directs this 
Court to "consider and decide [the jury 
selection] contention in the first instance " 
Gattis v State DelSupr, CrA No 37 
1996, Holland, J (October 15 1996) 
(ORDER) (emphasis added) Based on this 
direction, the Court does not subject Gattis' 
argument to the standard procedural detaults 
Copr e West 2003 No Claim to Ong US Govt Works 
Not Keponea in A IQ 
(Cite as: 1996 W L 769328 (Del.Super.)) 
of Rule_6_lLQ, but rather addresses the issue 
on its merits 
Under Rule 61, "any claim not asserted in 
the proceedings leading to the judgment of 
conviction" is barred unless the defendant 
can show cause for his default and actual 
prejudice Super Ct Cnm R 61(0(3), 
Flamer \ State Del Supr, 585 \ 2d ""16. 
"4" (19QU), Johnson v State Del Supr , 460 
\ 2 J 53() 540 (1983) "Cause" for a 
procedural default ordinarily requires a 
showing of some external impediment 
preventing counsel from constructing or 
raising a claim. Younger v State, Del Supr, 
vSO A 2d 552 (1990), Flamet v State. 585 
A 2d at ""*6 Gattis' conviction was affirmed 
on February 28, 1994 See Gattis v State 
Del Supr , 63" A 2d 808 810(1994) Gattis' 
petition for certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court was denied October 3, 1994 
Gams v Delaware. 115 S Ct 132 (1994) 
The JEB decision was announced April 
19 1994 JEB v \labama ex lei TB 511 
I -> 1^1 (J?94J ^ the instant motion were 
considered under the procedural default of 
Rule 61(0(3), Gattis could have 
demonstrated that these facts constituted an 
external impediment which prevented his 
counsel from presenting the JEB claim at 
trial or on direct appeal. However, he could 
not set forth concrete allegations of actual 
prejudice to avoid the procedural default. 
} outlet \ State. 580 A 2d at 556 
Gattis might also have moved for relief from 
the procedural bar on the grounds that it not 
apply to 'a colorable claim that there was a 
miscarriage of justice because of a 
constitutional violation that undermined the 
fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or 
fairness or the proceedings leading to the 
judgment of conviction." Super Ct Cnm R 
()lu)p) In light of this Court's finding in 
the instant opinion that the State did not 
impermissibly exercise its peremptory 
challenges, Gattis would not have succeeded 
with this claim. 
The United States Supreme Court has established a 
three-step analysis to be used to test the 
constitutionality of peremptory challenges allegedly 
based on invidious racial discrimination Batson \ 
Kifituckx 4~6 ( >> "9 94(19^6), Robertson v State 
Del Supr , 6^0 \ 2d 10S4. 1088-89 (199^) In J E B 
\ Alabama e\ iel TB the Court held that the 
Batson analysis also applies to claims of gender-
Paee 2 
related discrimination in jury selection 1J4 s c t at 
L4.29-2P 
To establish such a claim, the defendant mubt first 
make a prima facie case of discrimination 'bv 
showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives 
rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose ' 
Batson 4"6 L b at 94, Robatson \ Stutt 6 ;0 \ 2d 
at I0fr9 Second, if the prima facie case has been 
established the burden shifts to the State to articulate 
a gender-neutral explanation, which must not be 
pretextual Batson 476 U S at 9^-98 J LB 114 
S Ct at 14 29 This step requires the State to offer a 
neutral reason, which is "not a reason that makes 
sense, but a reason that does not deny equal 
protection.' Putkett v Elan 115 S C t T69 r H 
(1995] (per curiam) Finally, the trial court must 
determine whether the defendant has carried his 
burden of proving purposeful discrimination Id That 
is, "the trial court must undertake a factual inquiry' 
that 'takes into account all possible explanatory 
factors' in the particular case" Batson at 95, quoting 
\le\ander\ Louisiana 405 L S 625 630(19^2) 
*2 Throughout the analysis, "the ultimate burden of 
persuasion regarding racial [or gender] motivation 
rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the 
strike " Put kett \ El em 115 S Ct. at P " ! 
The analysis changes somewhat when a prosecutor 
offers both discriminatory and nondiscriminatory 
reasons for the strike For Batson claims, four circuits 
have adopted the so-called dual motivation analysis 
\\r\3\ See Wallace \ Uomson 8" r- 3d \r 1 (11 th 
C ir 1996) (applying dual motivation where 
prosecutor stated that race was one factor he 
considered in the exercise of peremptory strikes), 
L nited Stares \ Darden ^0 V M IMF uSth C ir 
1995) (applying dual motivation where prosecutor 
struck on basis of youth, inexperience, and alleged 
young black female tendency to show sympathy for 
individuals involved with narcotics), cert denied 116 
SCt 1449, and cert denied, 116 S Ct 256" (1996), 
Jones- \ Plastet, 5" \ 3d 41 7 (4th _( i_r__ l W j 
(applying dual motivation but remanding to district 
court for clarification of findings regarding whether 
the strike was exercised for a discriminatory purpose 
and whether it would have been exercised in the 
absence of discriminatory purpose), I low at d v 
Senkowski 9S6 V 2d 24 (2d Cir 1993) (applying dual 
motivation analysis to prosecutor's pre-Batson 
statements) 
F-N3 The Court notes that 'resort to dual 
motivation will rarelv be necessary 
Copr c West 2003 No Claim to Orig US Govt Works 
Not Reported in A.id 
(Cite as: 1996 WL 769328 (Del.Super.)) 
[because] by now, no competent prosecutor 
or defense attorney is unaware of the fact 
that strikes on the basis of race or gender are 
prohibited." United States v To Lin. 95 F.3d 
1520. 1534 (11th Or. 19%). Tokars' trial, 
like Gams', took place before it was clear 
whether Batson would be extended to 
eender. 
In United Status v Tokars. 95 F.3d 1520 (11th Or. 
1996), the dual motivation analysis was held 
applicable to J.E.B. claims, that is, claims that the 
State used its peremptory strikes to exclude potential 
jurors on the basis of gender. Under the dual 
motivation test, after the defendant has made a prima 
facie showing of discrimination, the State may raise 
the affirmative defense that the strike would have 
been exercised on the basis of the race- neutral 
reasons and in the absence of the discriminatory 
motive. Wallace v. Morrison, 37 F.3d at 1274, citing 
Howard v. Senkowski. 986 F.2d at 30. The State bears 
the burden of making this showing by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Id. If the court 
concludes that the State has made such a showing, 
the peremptory challenge is not subject to 
constitutional attack. United States v. Darden, 70 
F.3dat 1531. 
Both the Batson test and the dual motivation analysis 
require that the court make factual findings regarding 
the state's use of its peremptory challenges. However, 
under Batson, the burden remains with the defendant 
to show discriminatory purpose, Purkett v. Elem. 115 
S.Ct. at P71, whereas under dual motivation 
analysis, the burden shifts to the state if it raises the 
affirmative defense. Wallace v. Morrison, 87 F.3d at 
1274. Despite this difference, the court's fact-finding 
function in the final step is the same under both tests, 
and the cases using the Batson test provide guidelines 
which are also useful for the final step of the dual 
motivation analysis. For this reason, the Court relies 
on both Batson cases and dual motivation cases in 
analyzing the case at bar. 
FACTS 
*3 During jury selection in Gattis' capital murder 
trial, the State used one of its peremptory challenges 
to strike Wilfred Moore from the panel. Prior to the 
challenge, the Court engaged in the following 
colloquy with Mr. Moore: 
Q: If the facts and circumstances so warrant, could 
you recommend a sentence of death? 
A: Yes, sir, I could. 
Q: All right. Well, let's go back to that. If the facts 
Copr. c West 2003 No Cla: 
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and circumstances so warrant, could vou 
recommend a sentence of life imprisonment'* 
A: Yes, sir, I could. 
Q: All right. Now. you did indicate that you would 
follow the Court's instructions on the law whether 
you agreed with that law or not. 
A: Right. 
Q: Taking those instructions in mind, then, and 
taking into account all the facts and circumstances, 
now, if the facts and circumstances so warrant and 
if the Court's instructions so permit, could you 
recommend a sentence of death? 
A: It's like going to war. I don't know if I - you 
know, until the time comes, truly in my heart 
would I know if I could bring a bullet up there. I 
don't know until the time comes. 
Q: Okay. Philosophically, generally, you're not 
opposed to the death penalty? 
A: I believe in the death penalty, but I don't know 
if I could be the one to say, yes, sentence this 
defendant to death until the time comes. 
Q: Okay. Would you give it a conscientious effort 
to apply the law and to follow your duties as a 
juror? 
A: Yes, sir, I would. 
The Court then asked Mr. Moore to step out of the 
courtroom, and the prosecutor requested that Moore 
be struck for cause. The prosecutor, Mark Bunitsky, 
Esquire, argued that Moore was uncomfortable being 
asked to vote for death and unsure of his ability to do 
so. After hearing arguments from both the State and 
the defense, this Court concluded that Moore's 
responses did not meet the Witherspoon standard and 
therefore declined to exclude him for cause. See 
Witherspoon v. Illinois. 391 I .S. 510 (1968). The 
State men entered its challenge. 
After Mr. Moore was excused, the prosecutor 
requested the Court's permission to make a record of 
his reasons for the strike. He offered two reasons for 
his actions: 
Number one, I believe that this juror was very, very 
conservative in his application of the possible 
application of the death penalty. He answered very 
quickly yes to the possibility of imposing a life 
sentence under the appropriate facts and 
circumstances, yet, to our belief, had a very 
difficult time in answering whether or not he could 
impose the death penalty under the appropriate 
circumstances. He seemed to be very, very 
conservative in the application of the death penalty. 
Number two, he is an older gentleman and we 
have, I believe, four or five older gentlemen on the 
jury panel already. And I would suggest that it's the 
State's point of view that we would prefer to have 
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some more women on the jury 
This Court then made the following findings 
All right I would just observe again for the record 
that in light of his responses, it's not surprising at 
all that the State utilized a challenge, and I'm 
convinced beyond any doubt whatsoever that that 
challenge was not predicated upon racial motives 
*4 At the time Mr Moore was struck from the panel, 
four men and three women had been selected for 
Gattis' jury The State had used four of its peremptory 
challenges to remove two men and two women. After 
Moore was removed, the State challenged two men 
and three women (one of whom was a potential 
alternate juror). In its final form, the jury consisted of 
six men and six women. Of the four alternate jurors, 
one was a man, three were women. 
DISCUSSION 
In Batson \ Kentutk\, 476 I S at 87. the United 
States Supreme Court stated that "[t]he harm from 
discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that 
inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to 
touch the entire community Selection procedures 
that purposefully exclude black persons from junes 
undermine public confidence in the fairness of our 
system of justice." The Batson Court held that the 
Equal Protection Clause forbids a prosecutor to 
peremptorily challenge jurors solely on account of 
race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group 
will be unable to impartially consider the prosecution 
against a black defendant. [FN4] Id at 95. 
F\4 The principle that preventing 
members of a particular group of people 
from serving on juries is unconstitutional is 
a well-established principle in equal 
protection jurisprudence. In Strauderv Heir 
I'lnnma 100 I S 303 (1880), the Court 
held that a State denies a black defendant 
equal protection of laws when it puts him on 
trial before a jury from which members of 
his race have been purposefully excluded. 
The Strauder Court explained that the 
central concern of the recently ratified 
Fourteenth Amendment was to put an end to 
governmental discrimination on account of 
race I no I S at 306-307 
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peremptory strikes to remove nearly all the men from 
the jury in a paternity suit on the grounds that men 
would be more receptive to the putative father while 
the women would be more sympathetic to the child's 
mother Id at 1426 The Court concluded that such a 
practice violates equal protection, and held that 
gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy tor 
juror competence and impartiality, especially where 
the discrimination perpetuates invidious stereotypes 
about men and women. |F\>] 11-4 S C t at 1421-22 
F\5 Since Reed v Reed 404 I S 
InJFB Uahcuna ,\ ul fB 114 S ( t at 1419, 
the Court was asked to decide whether the Equal 
Protection Clause forbids intentional discrimination 
on the basis of sender The state had used its 
(19M K the Supreme Court has subjected 
gender-based classifications to "heightened 
scrutiny" in light of the danger that 
government policies which purport to be 
based on reasonable concerns may in fact be 
reflective of overboard stereotypes about 
gender J LB, 114 SCt at 1424 Lnder 
equal protection analysis, the heightened 
scrutiny standard requires that gender-based 
classifications be supported by "an 
exceedingly persuasive justification" to 
withstand constitutional scrutiny l_d_ at 
1425. 
InJEB, the State asserted that its decision 
to strike almost all the males from the jury 
had a reasonable basis in the perception that 
men might be more sympathetic to the 
putative father in a paternity suit, and 
women might be more sympathetic to the 
mother. Id at 1426 The Court refused to 
accept as a defense the same type of 
stereotype which the law itself condemns 
Id No such invidious stereotype has been 
advanced or suggested in the case at bar 
Based on the holding mJEB Gattis argues that he 
was denied equal protection of laws when the State 
used one of its peremptory strikes to remove Moore 
from the panel The applicable test to evaluate this 
claim is the dual motivation analysis _LKM>1 ^ 
Wallace v Morrison, S7 I- 3d at 12^4, ( nited Sfr/'c ^ 
v Tnkars 95 \r 5d at 1520 Dual motivation analysis 
grants the ptoponent of the allegedly discriminatory 
strike the opportunity to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the strike would have been 
exercised even in the absence of the discriminatory 
motivation
 LF\"| Wallace v Motnson T f-3d at 
127S 
h\6 Like other cases based on the Equal 
Protection Clause, the purpose of both 
Copr c West 2003 No Claim to Ong US Govt Works 
Not Reported in A 2d 
(Cite as: 1996 WL 769328 (Del.Super.)) 
Batson and J.E.B. is to prevent intentional, 
invidious discrimination against certain 
cognizable groups. As in other areas of 
equal protection jurisprudence, an action 
motivated in part by an impermissible 
reason will nonetheless be valid if the same 
action would have been taken in the absence 
of the impermissible motivation. Mt. 
Healthy Cm Sell. Bd. ofEJuc. v Doyle. 429 
U.S. 2~4(19~), 
FN 7, In the case at bar, the need for a prima 
facie showing of intentional discrimination 
is obviated by the fact that the State in effect 
concedes that gender played a part in its 
decision. Wallace v. Morrison. 87 F.3d at 
1275. Sec also Hernandez v. Sew York. 500 
U.S. 352. 359(1991); Johnson v. Vazquez. 3 
F.3d 132", 1329 (9th Or. 1993), cert, 
denied, 114S.O. 1838(1994). 
The State asserts that its primary reason for striking 
Moore was his unwillingness to impose a penalty of 
death and that the prosecutor would have challenged 
him for that reason alone. In evaluating this assertion, 
the Court must consider "all relevant circumstances." 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 96. In other words, 
this decision entails a "Tactual inquiry' that 'takes into 
account all possible explanatory factors' in the 
particular case." Id. at 95, quoting Alexander v. 
Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625. 630 (1972). See also 
Hernandez v. Sew )ork, 500 U.S. at 363 (observing 
that an "invidious discriminatory purpose may often 
be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts.") 
*5 Considering the totality of the circumstances 
entails a review of the number of men and women on 
the panel as well as the number of strikes used by the 
State to remove both men and women. The Court 
notes that in Batson the jury was all white and that in 
J.E.B., the jury was all women. [FN8] Even in 
extreme cases such as these, a showing of disparate 
impact does not in itself violate equal protection 
unless the defendant can show that the exclusion was 
purposeful. Hernandez v. Sew York, 500 U.S. at 360. 
On the other hand, when intentional discrimination is 
the motivating factor, equal protection is offended at 
the exclusion of even one juror on the basis of race or 
gender. J.E.B. at 1428, n 13. 
FN8. In Batson, after certain potential 
jurors had been excused for cause, the 
prosecutor used his peremptory challenges 
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to strike all four remaining black people 
from the venire, resulting in an all-white 
jury for the trial of a black defendant. In 
J.E.B., after the court excused three potential 
jurors for cause, the prosecutor used nine of 
its ten peremptory strikes to remove nine of 
the remaining ten men. and the defendant 
used one of its peremptory strikes to remo\e 
the other man, resulting in a jury composed 
only of women. J E.B. 114S.Ct. at 1421-22. 
Although neither the Batson test nor the dual 
motivation test requires a showing of disparate 
impact, the quantifiable effect of a state actor's 
actions is an implied factor in equal protection 
analysis. For example, in Hernandez v Sew York, the 
Court stated that "[i]f a prosecutor articulates a basis 
for a peremptory challenge that results in the 
disproportionate exclusion of members of a certain 
race the trial judge may consider that fact as evidence 
that the prosecutor's stated reason constitutes a 
pretext for racial discrimination." 500 U.S. at 363 
(emphasis added). See also United States v. Darden, 
7Q F.3d at 1530, n. 8 (reviewing the government's use 
of its challenges to dispel allegations of 
discrimination). 
Although disparate impact alone is not sufficient to 
establish a violation of equal protection, impact may 
be considered as one of the relevant factors, along 
with the manner in which the State exercised its 
strikes throughout the jury selection process. In the 
case at bar, the facts do not show that the prosecutor's 
actions had a disparate impact on the make-up of the 
jury or that the prosecution used its peremptory 
challenges in a discriminatory way. To the contrary, 
at the time Mr. Moore was struck from the panel, 
four men and three women had been selected for 
Gattis' jury. The State had used four of its challenges 
to remove two men and two women. After Moore 
was removed, the State used two strikes to remove 
men and three strikes to remove women. In its final 
form, the jury consisted of six men and six women. 
Of the four alternate jurors, one was a man, three 
were women. On these facts, the Court does not 
discern any intent to discriminate against men on the 
part of the prosecution. As the Hernandez court 
stated, "[ejqual protection analysis turns on the 
intended consequences of government 
classifications." 500 U.S. at 359-60. Viewing the 
consequences of the prosecutor's actions throughout 
jury selection, this Court finds nothing to suggest that 
the prosecutor intended to exclude men from Gattis' 
jury. 
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Another relevant aspect of the mquirv is the 
prosecutors credibility The court's finding as to 
intent is a 'pure issue ol fact," ILmanck. \ \LW 
)ork M)Q { ^ at 365, which 'largely will turn on 
evaluation of credibility ' Barson 4~6 L s at 9y n 
21 The Supreme Court has made it clear that the trial 
judge is best suited to make this determination 
*6 In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry the 
decisive question will be whether counsel's race-
neutral [or gender-neutral] explanation for a 
peremptory challenge should be believed There 
will seldom be much evidence bearing on that 
issue, and the best evidence often will be the 
demeanor of the attorney who exercises the 
challenge 4s with the state of mind of a juror 
e\aluation oj the prosecutor's state of mind based 
on demeanor and credibility lies 'peculiarly within 
a trial judge s province " 
fftniandtz \ \ew )oik ^00 [ S at 365 citing 
Hdmunzht v Witt. 469 I ^ 412, 428 (1984) 
(emphasis added) These observations, which were 
made in regard to the Batson test, also pertain to the 
final step in the dual motivation test wherein the 
Court must determine whether the State has shown 
that it would have exercised the strike solely on the 
basis of the nondiscriminatory reasons Wallace v 
Morrison 986 F 2d at 30 
In the case at bar, the prosecutor stated that he 
challenged Moore because of Moore's ambivalence 
regarding capital punishment All of the discussion 
about Moore addressed this issue and Moore's ability 
to impose a sentence of death [F\9] There is 
nothing in the record which indicates that the 
prosecution was driven by invidious gender-based 
stereotypes Furthermore, this Court observed on the 
record that 'in light of his responses, it's not 
surprising at all that the State utilized a challenge, 
and I'm conv inced beyond any doubt whatsoever that 
that challenge was not predicated upon racial 
motives ' In other words, the Court accepted the 
States proffered rationale for challenging Moore 
because of his ambivalence about the death penalty 
Such ambivalence is an appropriate reason for a 
peremptory strike in a capital case Ste Brown \ 
\nnh Camhna, 479 L S 940 (1986)(Q'Connor, J, 
concurring in the denial of certiorari), Baynard v 
State Del Supr, 518 A 2d 6b2. 685-86 (1990) Based 
on a totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that 
the State has carried its burden of showing that the 
prosecutor would have challenged Moore even in the 
absence of any gender-related reason 
t_N9 The two prosecutors assigned to this 
case Mark Bunitsky Esquire and Marsha 
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Epstein Esquire, are both experienced trial 
attornevs who have always impressed the 
Court with their forthrightness and candor 
They take their responsibilities as otficers ot 
the court with seriousness and fidelity Both 
prosecutors are considered to be credible 
and reliable professionals While Mr 
Bunitsky offered the States rationale tor its 
challenge of Mr Moore the prosecutors 
conferred with each other throughout the 
jury selection process 
In regard to the prosecutor's gender-based 
motivation, the Court is satisfied that this 
consideration was de minimus The prosecutor stated 
that several men had already been selected and that 
he wanted to select a few more women On its face 
this statement indicates that the prosecutor was tr\ mg 
to seat a jury with a 'diverse and representative 
character, [which] must be maintained partly as 
assurance of a diffused impartiality and partly 
because sharing in the administration of justice is a 
phase of civic responsibility '" J E B at 1424, quoting 
Ta\lor\ Louisiana 419 1 S ^22, > 0-M (19^) In 
light of the fact that four men had already been 
selected foi Gattis' jury when Moore was challenged, 
it is not plausible that the prosecutor's stated desire 
for a mix of men and women was a pretext for a 
desire to exclude men because of "invidious archaic 
and overbroad stereotypes" JEB at 1422 In fact 
viewing the statement in the context of the Court's 
colloquy with Moore regarding capital punishment 
and counsels' arguments regarding Moore s suitability 
under Witherspoon the brief reference to gender 
seems more like an afterthought than a 'substantial 
part of the motivation' for the strike \\ tUact \ 
Morrison 87 P Mat 12^ 4 
*7 The J EB Court found that when prosecutors 
exercise peremptory challenges 'in reliance on 
gender stereotypes, they ratify and reinforce 
prejudicial views of the relative abilities of women 
and men" 114 S i t at 142^ This Court finds no 
evidence that the prosecutor in the case at bar relied 
on such unfair and outdated stereotypes Based on a 
totality of the circumstances, this Court is satisfied 
that gender was at most a de minimus factor in the 
State's decision to challenge Moore and that the State 
would have challenged Moore even in the absence of 
any discriminatory reason 
COi\CLLSlON 
For all the toregomg reasons the defendants motion 
tor a new trial on the grounds of improper use ot 
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peremptory challenges is hereby DENIED 
It Is So ORDERED 
1996 WL 769328 (Del Super) 
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